Yeah, we know logical positivism was misguided. On the other hand, it's demolishment owes as much to analytic philosophers like Quine, Kuhn, and so on (indeed, it was already largely dead by the time of the publication of Two Dogmas) as it does to Popper. Rumors of the death of analytic philosophy as a whole, on the other hand, have been greatly exaggerated, methinks.
Incidentally, as I commented earlier to you, I'm generally of the (dominant) view that Kuhn has put Popperian falsificationism to rest. I'm surprised you didn't address him here, since his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is generally considered a seminal work in philosophy of science.
And the problem of induction has been greatly overblown. It seems to me to only be a problem if one subscribes to some sort of moderate empiricist view, and I don't see how anyone can justify that. There are plenty of responses to the problem of induction, from "ordinary language" philosophers (Strawson) to rationalists (BonJour) to Quineans, whom I find really difficult to actually take seriously.
Induction is boring. Phil of lang is where it's at.
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Date: 2005-11-16 09:30 pm (UTC)Incidentally, as I commented earlier to you, I'm generally of the (dominant) view that Kuhn has put Popperian falsificationism to rest. I'm surprised you didn't address him here, since his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is generally considered a seminal work in philosophy of science.
And the problem of induction has been greatly overblown. It seems to me to only be a problem if one subscribes to some sort of moderate empiricist view, and I don't see how anyone can justify that. There are plenty of responses to the problem of induction, from "ordinary language" philosophers (Strawson) to rationalists (BonJour) to Quineans, whom I find really difficult to actually take seriously.
Induction is boring. Phil of lang is where it's at.