Indo-China is one place where Americans reaped what they sowed.
Because "the Third World" became such a source of "authenticity" to the academic Left, there has not been much examination of the incredible folly, perpetuated not only by the Truman but also the Eisenhower Administrations (so it was bipartisan), of American support for decolonization in the two decades immediately following World War II.
This support originated not only in outright Communist moles such as White and Hiss, but also in a general American hostility to empire which still exists today (the reasone we didn't really fight a "war for oil," which might have worked better in terms of American interests). Our nation having originated in an anti-colonial secession movement, we tended to uncritically support the anti-colonialists in our first essays at Great Power postwar diplomacy, both under Wilson at Versailles and under Truman and Eisenhower through the United Nations.
This had disastrous consequences. The small states of Central Europe that Wilson helped create were but appetizers to Hitler and Mussolini; the Third World nations that emerged from the post World War II breakup of colonial empires were not only small, and hence similar treats served up for the delectation of Stalin and his successors, but also barbaric, and hence barely able (in some cases unable) to even rule themselves.
We tended to draw analogies between the new Third World states and the nascent American Republic of the late 18th century; between their secession struggles and our own Revolutionary War. We missed the important difference: we were civilized and struggling to achieve liberty; they were barbaric and struggling to achieve local tyrannies. It was this confusion that led to the misguided American tolerance extended to Ho Chi Minh, Gamel Abdul Nasser, and Fidel Castro, in the beginning of their reigns.
The worst consequence of this was not our lack of support for France in 1945-54, but rather our lack of support for Britain, France and Israel in 1956 in the Suez Crisis. Here we took the side of Nasser against our own NATO allies and the only democracy in the Mideast, mostly to curry favor with the Third World.
To salve their pride the British and French have decided now that they were in the wrong, but they were clearly in the right -- Nasser was in violation of the teaty that had returned the Canal to Egyptian control. We gained nothing by this betrayal, and we paid heavily for it -- this is one of the reasons why Europe was willing to trade with North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.
Indeed, this was one of the direct provocations that turned France anti-American.
The lesson we should take from this: Never betray long-time allies to curry favor with potential allies.
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Because "the Third World" became such a source of "authenticity" to the academic Left, there has not been much examination of the incredible folly, perpetuated not only by the Truman but also the Eisenhower Administrations (so it was bipartisan), of American support for decolonization in the two decades immediately following World War II.
This support originated not only in outright Communist moles such as White and Hiss, but also in a general American hostility to empire which still exists today (the reasone we didn't really fight a "war for oil," which might have worked better in terms of American interests). Our nation having originated in an anti-colonial secession movement, we tended to uncritically support the anti-colonialists in our first essays at Great Power postwar diplomacy, both under Wilson at Versailles and under Truman and Eisenhower through the United Nations.
This had disastrous consequences. The small states of Central Europe that Wilson helped create were but appetizers to Hitler and Mussolini; the Third World nations that emerged from the post World War II breakup of colonial empires were not only small, and hence similar treats served up for the delectation of Stalin and his successors, but also barbaric, and hence barely able (in some cases unable) to even rule themselves.
We tended to draw analogies between the new Third World states and the nascent American Republic of the late 18th century; between their secession struggles and our own Revolutionary War. We missed the important difference: we were civilized and struggling to achieve liberty; they were barbaric and struggling to achieve local tyrannies. It was this confusion that led to the misguided American tolerance extended to Ho Chi Minh, Gamel Abdul Nasser, and Fidel Castro, in the beginning of their reigns.
The worst consequence of this was not our lack of support for France in 1945-54, but rather our lack of support for Britain, France and Israel in 1956 in the Suez Crisis. Here we took the side of Nasser against our own NATO allies and the only democracy in the Mideast, mostly to curry favor with the Third World.
To salve their pride the British and French have decided now that they were in the wrong, but they were clearly in the right -- Nasser was in violation of the teaty that had returned the Canal to Egyptian control. We gained nothing by this betrayal, and we paid heavily for it -- this is one of the reasons why Europe was willing to trade with North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.
Indeed, this was one of the direct provocations that turned France anti-American.
The lesson we should take from this: Never betray long-time allies to curry favor with potential allies.
That's the lesson I take from it, anyway.