The lesson I draw from it is rather different. It is: do not imagine that you are different from everyone else. The rise of America was as much a part of European colonialism as the settling of Algeria, Canada, Siberia, Australia, South Africa and Argentina by immigrants from Europe. The same forces that drove cattle and grain farmers across the Missisippi drove them through Australia and Argentina, and indeed there is very little difference between the image of the horse-riding, cattle-driving pioneer in the three countries - stockman, cowboy, gaucho. The American notion that they somehow had more in common with the anti-colonialist local elites in Africa and Asia than with the European communities were pure delusion (comparable to the similar delusion that led Argentina to invade the Falkland Islands, a tiny slice of Britain in the South Atlantic, claiming to be fighting British imperialism when they were imposing Argentian imperialism on a small British community).
There is more, and you are not being nearly forceful enough. Eisenhower did not show "lack of support" in 1956 towards his own NATO allies: he stabbed them in the back, and incidentally allowed the Soviets to get away with their contemporary murder of Hungary. And from Versailles in 1919 to the Suez crisis, the American claim to be an anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist power has only one real meaning: to reduce the major European powers to impotence. Like Wilson, Eisenhower wanted Europe to be essentially an American toy. The thrust of the Suez crisis was to make an independent European foreign policy impossible, and, thanks to British cowardice and subjection (the French and Israelis would have gone on), it succeeded for a few decades.
Essentially, however, Eisenhower had bet on the wrong horse. The Arabs were going nowhere - as Israel dramatically demonstrated in 1967 - and, in the long run, Soviet domination over Eastern Europe was untenable. Conversely, the vicious historicistic jargon of "declining powers" and "old Europe" does not allow people to notice the enormous concentration of economic power between Lisbon and Berlin and between Oslo and Palermo, a concentration that has done nothing but grow, and that, with the collapse of Soviet power, has received an extra boost. People are looking at China with wonder, but the real centre of the world's economy remains Europe. London has recently surpassed New York City as a trading centre, for the first time in ninety years. Europe is slowly awakening, confused and bewildered by fifty years of subservience, to its own enormous power. The only tool it is using to extend its reach, for the present, is money; but it has so much of that that its reach is constantly growing. European governments are having to make decisions on a world stage for the first time in fifty years, and no wonder that many of them move stupidly, ignorantly, or like men in a dream. But the legend of "declining" and "rising", "old" and "young" nations, must die once and for all, before people begin to realize what the world really is like.
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There is more, and you are not being nearly forceful enough. Eisenhower did not show "lack of support" in 1956 towards his own NATO allies: he stabbed them in the back, and incidentally allowed the Soviets to get away with their contemporary murder of Hungary. And from Versailles in 1919 to the Suez crisis, the American claim to be an anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist power has only one real meaning: to reduce the major European powers to impotence. Like Wilson, Eisenhower wanted Europe to be essentially an American toy. The thrust of the Suez crisis was to make an independent European foreign policy impossible, and, thanks to British cowardice and subjection (the French and Israelis would have gone on), it succeeded for a few decades.
Essentially, however, Eisenhower had bet on the wrong horse. The Arabs were going nowhere - as Israel dramatically demonstrated in 1967 - and, in the long run, Soviet domination over Eastern Europe was untenable. Conversely, the vicious historicistic jargon of "declining powers" and "old Europe" does not allow people to notice the enormous concentration of economic power between Lisbon and Berlin and between Oslo and Palermo, a concentration that has done nothing but grow, and that, with the collapse of Soviet power, has received an extra boost. People are looking at China with wonder, but the real centre of the world's economy remains Europe. London has recently surpassed New York City as a trading centre, for the first time in ninety years. Europe is slowly awakening, confused and bewildered by fifty years of subservience, to its own enormous power. The only tool it is using to extend its reach, for the present, is money; but it has so much of that that its reach is constantly growing. European governments are having to make decisions on a world stage for the first time in fifty years, and no wonder that many of them move stupidly, ignorantly, or like men in a dream. But the legend of "declining" and "rising", "old" and "young" nations, must die once and for all, before people begin to realize what the world really is like.