It seems necessary to repeat myself. These bands have shown, time and again, that they are incapable of facing a decent army on the battlefield. Not only Americans in Afghanistan, but Russians in Chechnya and Ethiopians in Somalia, have carved through their defences like butter. Hence it is literally impossible for their guerrilla operations to consolidate into an armed force as the Yugoslav partisans did in World War Two. Any time they start establishing themselves as a power with a definite territory, they become nothing more than targets for their enemies. And this is not a coincidence: it is a function of the kind of fighter a mujahid is. A million more Somalias and Afghanistans would only result in a million more three-week smashdowns.
This is true for "mujahideen" and it is true against Western armies. Your argument however only applies in the case of mujahideen fighting Western armies, which is not the only situation we need to worry about.
First of all, when an Islamic Fundamentalist faction seizes control of a state (or large enough region within a state), it is no longer limited to deploying "mujahideen," it acquires the capability to field regular forces. If we were to go to war with Iran tomorrow, for instance, we would find ourselves facing regular troops, warplanes and warships on the field of battle; if we were to wait to go to war with Iran until 5-10 years from now, we would also be facing nuclear missiles.
Secondly, though this isn't reported much by a media that cares little about anything not involving the First World, Islamic forces are not only facing Western armies, they are also facing Eastern (Pact-style) and African (hopeless bad-comedy style) armies, and in some cases guerillas or militias. In Darfur, for example, the Sudanese regular (though very inept) army has been fighting anti-Muslim militias in the south. In Africa in general, Islam is expanding, in part due to Muslim armies and in part to Muslim militias and guerillas (more so than terrorists). Ethiopia's local reversal of this trend in Somalia is encouraging, but only the east flank of a struggle stretching across the breadth of Africa.
Indeed, these things are not even relevant. Once the mujahid is smashed off from his impossible attempt to become a regular soldier, he reverts to his original bandit guise, with much more success. He is incapable of holding Kabul or Mogadiscio in front of a determined effort by a regular army, but he is capable, and eagerly willing, to kill at random whenever he can, to make the work of administering a country as impossible for others as it is for himself. He is a mere agent of ruin; which is one reason why this conflict is unlike any war in history.
The insurgent level you are describing is "guerilla," and far from being "unlike any war in history," this sort of conflict is very common in history. Guerilla forces cannot effectively resist regular armies but they can resist paramilitary and police forces, enabling them to prevent the proper administration of an area. They can be knocked down to terrorist level operations by resolute and numerous patrols and garrisons; if left to fester they build to main force strength, creating a "liberated zone." This is all very standard insurgency / counter-insurgency theory, and practice.
In fact, it's older than main force warfare -- this sort of raiding / counter-raiding activity is what pitched battles evolved from.
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This is true for "mujahideen" and it is true against Western armies. Your argument however only applies in the case of mujahideen fighting Western armies, which is not the only situation we need to worry about.
First of all, when an Islamic Fundamentalist faction seizes control of a state (or large enough region within a state), it is no longer limited to deploying "mujahideen," it acquires the capability to field regular forces. If we were to go to war with Iran tomorrow, for instance, we would find ourselves facing regular troops, warplanes and warships on the field of battle; if we were to wait to go to war with Iran until 5-10 years from now, we would also be facing nuclear missiles.
Secondly, though this isn't reported much by a media that cares little about anything not involving the First World, Islamic forces are not only facing Western armies, they are also facing Eastern (Pact-style) and African (hopeless bad-comedy style) armies, and in some cases guerillas or militias. In Darfur, for example, the Sudanese regular (though very inept) army has been fighting anti-Muslim militias in the south. In Africa in general, Islam is expanding, in part due to Muslim armies and in part to Muslim militias and guerillas (more so than terrorists). Ethiopia's local reversal of this trend in Somalia is encouraging, but only the east flank of a struggle stretching across the breadth of Africa.
Indeed, these things are not even relevant. Once the mujahid is smashed off from his impossible attempt to become a regular soldier, he reverts to his original bandit guise, with much more success. He is incapable of holding Kabul or Mogadiscio in front of a determined effort by a regular army, but he is capable, and eagerly willing, to kill at random whenever he can, to make the work of administering a country as impossible for others as it is for himself. He is a mere agent of ruin; which is one reason why this conflict is unlike any war in history.
The insurgent level you are describing is "guerilla," and far from being "unlike any war in history," this sort of conflict is very common in history. Guerilla forces cannot effectively resist regular armies but they can resist paramilitary and police forces, enabling them to prevent the proper administration of an area. They can be knocked down to terrorist level operations by resolute and numerous patrols and garrisons; if left to fester they build to main force strength, creating a "liberated zone." This is all very standard insurgency / counter-insurgency theory, and practice.
In fact, it's older than main force warfare -- this sort of raiding / counter-raiding activity is what pitched battles evolved from.