I believe that the ambitions of Al Qaeda and its allies reach farther than you imply. Yes, extortion of tribute, or of favorable diplomatic, political or social changes is one of their tactics and strategices, but it is not the only one; nor are terrorist teams their only type of forces.
The Terrorists do have national armies on their side; at present in the Mideast, the armies of Iran, Syria and the Sudan. Before our campaigns from 2001 to 2003, this included the armies of Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. The Terrorists field various guerilla as well as terrorist units; the reason why you have seen more use of terrorism than of guerilla or main force enemy operations in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars is not because of some doctrinal avoidance of guerilla or main force operations, but rather because our forces have been so active and competent in the field that the enemy has found any concentration of his own forces, even into guerilla bands, to be near-suicidal.
There have been periods of more traditional guerilla operations, by the way. In Afghanistan, where Allied forces are thin on the ground; in Pakistan, where a treacherous "ally" is providing a sanctuary (aided in this perfidy by the very main-force element of nuclear missiles); and at points in the Iraq campaign itself, when the Terorists tried to create a "liberated zone" in Fallujah (and did successfully coalesce into urban guerillas and small main force formations).
And modern terrorism, do not forget, is a Palestinian invention, began by Arafat after the catastrophe of 1967 proved once and for all that the most elaborate and massively armed Arab armies could not stand up to Israeli skill and discipline.
Note that the Palestinians climbed the insurgency ladder to guerilla and have now reached main force levels, as soon as they safely could. There are advantages to being higher on the ladder: main forces can do things that guerillas cannot; and guerillas things that terrorists cannot; what is more, higher-stage forces can always detach elements to carry out lower-stage missions, while the reverse is not true.
The strategy shifted from fighting a war to making life impossible for the enemy. And the sad thing is that it seems to be paying.
The point at which the payoff comes is when it induces withdrawal of our own forces -- letting the enemy build guerilla and main force units. Without main force units, in particular, the enemy cannot capture (or in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, recapture) any countries, to use as bases for further operations.
no subject
The Terrorists do have national armies on their side; at present in the Mideast, the armies of Iran, Syria and the Sudan. Before our campaigns from 2001 to 2003, this included the armies of Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. The Terrorists field various guerilla as well as terrorist units; the reason why you have seen more use of terrorism than of guerilla or main force enemy operations in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars is not because of some doctrinal avoidance of guerilla or main force operations, but rather because our forces have been so active and competent in the field that the enemy has found any concentration of his own forces, even into guerilla bands, to be near-suicidal.
There have been periods of more traditional guerilla operations, by the way. In Afghanistan, where Allied forces are thin on the ground; in Pakistan, where a treacherous "ally" is providing a sanctuary (aided in this perfidy by the very main-force element of nuclear missiles); and at points in the Iraq campaign itself, when the Terorists tried to create a "liberated zone" in Fallujah (and did successfully coalesce into urban guerillas and small main force formations).
And modern terrorism, do not forget, is a Palestinian invention, began by Arafat after the catastrophe of 1967 proved once and for all that the most elaborate and massively armed Arab armies could not stand up to Israeli skill and discipline.
Note that the Palestinians climbed the insurgency ladder to guerilla and have now reached main force levels, as soon as they safely could. There are advantages to being higher on the ladder: main forces can do things that guerillas cannot; and guerillas things that terrorists cannot; what is more, higher-stage forces can always detach elements to carry out lower-stage missions, while the reverse is not true.
The strategy shifted from fighting a war to making life impossible for the enemy. And the sad thing is that it seems to be paying.
The point at which the payoff comes is when it induces withdrawal of our own forces -- letting the enemy build guerilla and main force units. Without main force units, in particular, the enemy cannot capture (or in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, recapture) any countries, to use as bases for further operations.