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Prostitution of the pen and the dark side of the free market

Four years ago, the government of the French Republic took the lead in refusing to support the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. The French, who had taken a very active and successful part in the first Iraq war, simply did not think that an invasion followed by the occupation of an Arab country was a good idea. That was their prerogative (see under "sovereign state").

(My position was that I loathed Saddam Hussein so much that anyone who wanted to drive him out was fine by me. I would even have supported an Iranian invasion. But I would not have started to insult people who disagreed.)

The idiot part of the American right suddenly made France the bout of all their hatred. Someone spotted a market opportunity, as Americans do (the French do that as well, but when the French do it, that's evil!) and prostituted a certain amount of historical knowledge in the search for a quick buck, producing some sort of tract which rewrote history with the claim that "France have always been our enemy, but they have concealed it under a pretence of friendship".

I would dismiss this intellectually contemptible and factually fraudulent thesis in as many words, and not even bother about it, were it not that one of the finest minds in my f-list seems to have been taken in by it. As it is, I want to ask how you imagine you can trace a consistent attitude of hatred, and what is more, of subtly disguised hatred, in a nation that has, since the foundation of the United States, experienced three royalist constitutions, five republican ones, two bonapartist ones, and one fascist tyranny, and completely boxed the compass in terms of attitudes, views, and alliances. This is the kind of things that rabid anti-Semites postulate about Jews - attitudes consistent across the centuries, constant vicious subtlety in carrying them out, hatred fertile in invention but completely barren of reason. The French ought to be proud: they have been promoted to the rank of Chosen People, next to that other target of unreasoning, blind, stupid, despicable hatred. In case anyone had any doubts, I regard Jew-bashing as a stain on the face of mankind.

No doubt the prostitute or prostitutes who set out on this bit of free enterprise got out of it what they wanted - money, admiting letters from ignorami and fanatics, and the odd spot on TV talk shows; rewards that serious historians get rather less often. But as we are still free people here, I want to use my own freedom of expression, rather less despicably than the prostitute or prostitutes concerned: first, by calling whoredom by its proper name; and second, by stating clearly that there shall be no pity here for such views. The historical slag or slags who sold their integrity for popular success will not be treated as anything but filth, and anyone who takes them seriously is warned that I will do what is in my power to restore them to sanity.

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What is more, the French and European objection was not necessarily to war as such. It was to the notion of invading and occupying an Arab country. As everyone knows, all western secret services, certainly including the French and German ones, were convinced that Saddam did have weapons of mass destruction. Their point was simply that to invade and occupy an Arab country was to ask for trouble.

Why should Arab countries be granted special passes on account of their "Arabness?" Given the demonstrated military incompetence of the Arabs, I would argue the opposite -- and I think that Dubya's "Bring it on" was one of his few intelligent statements; it laid down a gauntlet that so far has resulted in a lot of Arab terrorists who might have hit New York or London and Paris leaving their bones sprayed into a lot of other Arabs, keeping the dying in dar al Islam -- where it BELONGS.

Here you fall into sheer rhetoric, and I think you realize what you are doing. Umpteen-squinchy UN resolutions do not add up to one plan, and I insist that American actions on the ground show that they had no idea what they meant to do with a nation that was anyway going to be infinitely more difficult to administer than Germany or Japan. Nor does the precedent of Germany and Japan, whether or not it proves any ability on the part of those who took part in it, prove much of anything - it was sixty years ago. Its protagonists, you may have noticed, are all dead.

Because, invade one, and you will have to invade them all. And square or compel the rest of the Muslim world. Arab borders are porous, and it takes no effort at all for mujaheddeen and suicide bombers to cross them. Japan or Germany could be handled in isolation, having a cohesive and clearly recognizable population or culture: the borders between Arab nations, on the other hand, are almost entirely artificial.

England, Poland, Denmark, Romania, Georgia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Albania, Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Macedonia, Moldova, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Spain, Hungary, Norway, Portugal, Iceland, and, oh yes, Italy...
Not a single one of whose public opinions favoured intervention. This was strictly a matter of political leaderships following the Americans, and, in most countries that matter (the presence of Bulgaria or Moldova in the field does not offer anyone much of anything), being punished for this. The Tory Blur has been forced out of his seat by his own party, who fear disaster at the next elections because of the immense unpopularity of the war (not improved by the recent humiliating display in the face of Iran); Aznar and Berlusconi are gone; it is only in Poland, and strictly for internal reasons, that a more pro-American government is in the saddle. Indeed, this may be said of the war: that without it the odious and incompetent Prodi and Zapatero governments, with their viciously divisive policies, would never have reached power. They will probably - please God! - lose the next elections, but that will not make Iraq any more popular in Italy or Spain.

It has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not ignorant Americans are justified in calling the French cowards. I was in the Italian Army when the Americans, having suffered one major terrorist attack, left Lebanon without even warning their supposed allies, a small British force and large French and Italian ones. And everyone remembers the similarly precipitate retreat from Somalia. A nation that, in the face of enemy fire, decamps without even warning its own allies, has no business calling anybody cowardly.

Kirkpatrick's distinction always struck me as one of the most odious pieces of apologetics ever designed by a clever and unprincipled person to make followers believe that black is white. The moral characteristic of police states is exactly the same, whether they drape themselves in black or in red. The midnight knock at the door, the terrified rumours about what happens in certain buildings and certain camps in the country, the sudden disappearances - sometimes for no discernible reason - and the creeping fear and demoralization that follows them, do not change. Kirkpatrick would have done better to point out that, in point of fact, most Latino military murderers killed rather less than most Communists did. Pinochet's proven murders, for instance, are about four thousand, which makes him a positive slacker as compared to most Communists. But any notion that government by fear and disappearance does not violate the basics of humanity is unworthy of an honest person. If you want a reason why Kirkpatrick was universally hated in Europe, this disgusting argument (as heard by societies where Fascism was a living memory) is a very good one.

I forbid you to discuss genocide on these columns. For your information, one of my dearest friends is a Muslim. For this reason, and for the subsidiary reason that genocide never succeeds (the most elaborate attempt ever seen was followed by the successful establishment of Israel, and even the Armenian nation is with us still), this kind of argument is not allowed on these columns.

P.S.: it is the first time I have ever forbidden an argument.

If we stopped applying force against the enemy, where they live, the terrorist groups would coalesce into guerilla bands, and the guerilla bands into main-force armies. They had both in Afghanistan and Iraq, before we destroyed them.
It seems necessary to repeat myself. These bands have shown, time and again, that they are incapable of facing a decent army on the battlefield. Not only Americans in Afghanistan, but Russians in Chechnya and Ethiopians in Somalia, have carved through their defences like butter. Hence it is literally impossible for their guerrilla operations to consolidate into an armed force as the Yugoslav partisans did in World War Two. Any time they start establishing themselves as a power with a definite territory, they become nothing more than targets for their enemies. And this is not a coincidence: it is a function of the kind of fighter a mujahid is. A million more Somalias and Afghanistans would only result in a million more three-week smashdowns.
Indeed, these things are not even relevant. Once the mujahid is smashed off from his impossible attempt to become a regular soldier, he reverts to his original bandit guise, with much more success. He is incapable of holding Kabul or Mogadiscio in front of a determined effort by a regular army, but he is capable, and eagerly willing, to kill at random whenever he can, to make the work of administering a country as impossible for others as it is for himself. He is a mere agent of ruin; which is one reason why this conflict is unlike any war in history.
Oddly enough, very few actual terrorists work that way.
Oddly enough, enormous numbers do. They are just not reported that way, thanks to the incompetence, cowardice and compromise of the Western media. When the Algerian Mark Levine went on a rampage in Quebec, killing fourteen young women, nobody reported that he was a Muslim angry at the status of women in the West. When a gang of Lebanese terrorized Sydney by a series of brutal rapes, it was only their own testimony in court that put on the record the fact that assaulting "uncovered" western women was religiously justified for them. Why do you think that Western jails are disproportionately full of Muslims - from thirty to eighty per cent according to country? Because one can justify just about any kind of violence against infidels from passages from the Qur'an or the Ahadith. You may take their property and their women, for all property belongs to Allah and infidels have no right to them. You can terrify them; indeed, it is your duty to. You can kill them whenever you find them. And the only thing you need to allow you to do so is a fatwa from a recognized religious authority, ruling that a state of war in a particular area exists. And even if you don't find the compliant religious authority (like the Algerian terrorists, who equipped themselves with a fatwa from the monstrous Jordanian sheikh Abu Qattada before they began the killing of about 150.000 fellow citizens, all Muslim), you often just set out on your own. Murderous lone wolves are not rare. You ought to read Jihadwatch or Little Green Footballs. They have even a word for it: Sudden Jihad Syndrome.

Get used to the fact that there is no war to win or to lose. There is a condition that applies across the world, whereas a certain group may at any time sprout violent men for no apparent reason. It is one of the many unpleasant features of human life, or of modern life if you will, like corporate corruption or political incompetence. You cannot put an end to it with any wars, although military campaigns can be one of the many means by which you work to bind, placate, block, or disable this tendency. To think of it in terms of a war is miserably restrictive and sure to fail. Remember the "war on poverty"? The war on terror - or even on Islam - will fail for the same reasons; because just like the poor, the fanatics are always with us. And what is worse, once you formulate the issue in those terms, you encourage your political enemies to point at the inevitable strategic failure of your efforts and conclude that the whole idea of a WoT was a delusion and that there is no problem. We are seeing Nancy Pelosi and some European lefties do so every day of the week. And the point is that the problem is not too small, but too big to be defined as a war. It is a part of life. And we must get used to seeing it as such. The sooner we drop these silly macho and ultimately escapist formulas - "war on crime", "war on poverty", "war on terror", "war on drugs" - the sooner we shall be ready and able to confront crime, poverty, fanaticism and drugs as they really are.

Ok.

Most European countries are awake to the threat of Islam

*hugs*
That is the most reasuring thing I've read in a week.

It's like we're facing the hordes that tore down Rome, but we know about it, and just watching....

Because, invade one, and you will have to invade them all.

Then ... given your assumption ... we should invade them all, and make the experience so unpleasant for them that the next time one Arab country is tempted to come to the defense of an Arab aggressor receiving its just punishment, the leadership thinks "Hmm, nope, I remember the last time we did this and we lost twenty years of economic development, we'll sit this one out.

But I find your assumption not borne out by history. Historically, Arab countries have repeatedly been defeated in isolation, with no or few other Arab states coming to their defense. Right now, in Iraq, our problems are with Syria (Arab) and Iran (Aryan), while Jordan (Arab) and Egypt (Arab), to take two examples, are not only not helping the rebels but are actively helping suppress attempts to aid them. In the Arab-Israeli Wars, non-frontline Arab states generally delivered only token and ineffectual aid to the Arab side: in some of the wars, no aid at all.

In Afghanistan, we do indeed have a problem with an "ally" actually providing sanctuary for Al Qaeda and the Taliban -- but that ally is Pakistan, an Aryan (not Arab) country. Indeed, one of the just critiques of the Iraq Campaign is that we should have finished off the Taliban first, and if we had not been involved in Iraq we could have exerted far more pressure on Pakistan to deny sanctuary to the foe.

Arab borders are porous, and it takes no effort at all for mujaheddeen and suicide bombers to cross them.

Neutral Arab states should act to capture and imprison such malefactors: those states which do not should be considered as our next targets. I see no problem with widening a war against those who believe that they can claim neutrality while aiding our enemies ... though, as I mentioned, that's a smaller problem than you're implying.

I think that the much-dreaded fanatical fury of the Arabs, and of Islam as a whole, is a gigantic bluff, with just enough reality behind it to cow the timorous. In fact the "fanatical" Arabs have been easy meat in both conventional and guerilla wafare, and even as terrorists mostly ineffectual, save against their own civilian populations. So far in Iraq we have taken very light losses and inflicted horrendous losses upon the enemy: and every young Terrorist killed in Iraq is a virus no longer able to spread.

Think of the US Armed Forces as the planet's white blood cells :)

It seems necessary to repeat myself. These bands have shown, time and again, that they are incapable of facing a decent army on the battlefield. Not only Americans in Afghanistan, but Russians in Chechnya and Ethiopians in Somalia, have carved through their defences like butter. Hence it is literally impossible for their guerrilla operations to consolidate into an armed force as the Yugoslav partisans did in World War Two. Any time they start establishing themselves as a power with a definite territory, they become nothing more than targets for their enemies. And this is not a coincidence: it is a function of the kind of fighter a mujahid is. A million more Somalias and Afghanistans would only result in a million more three-week smashdowns.

This is true for "mujahideen" and it is true against Western armies. Your argument however only applies in the case of mujahideen fighting Western armies, which is not the only situation we need to worry about.

First of all, when an Islamic Fundamentalist faction seizes control of a state (or large enough region within a state), it is no longer limited to deploying "mujahideen," it acquires the capability to field regular forces. If we were to go to war with Iran tomorrow, for instance, we would find ourselves facing regular troops, warplanes and warships on the field of battle; if we were to wait to go to war with Iran until 5-10 years from now, we would also be facing nuclear missiles.

Secondly, though this isn't reported much by a media that cares little about anything not involving the First World, Islamic forces are not only facing Western armies, they are also facing Eastern (Pact-style) and African (hopeless bad-comedy style) armies, and in some cases guerillas or militias. In Darfur, for example, the Sudanese regular (though very inept) army has been fighting anti-Muslim militias in the south. In Africa in general, Islam is expanding, in part due to Muslim armies and in part to Muslim militias and guerillas (more so than terrorists). Ethiopia's local reversal of this trend in Somalia is encouraging, but only the east flank of a struggle stretching across the breadth of Africa.

Indeed, these things are not even relevant. Once the mujahid is smashed off from his impossible attempt to become a regular soldier, he reverts to his original bandit guise, with much more success. He is incapable of holding Kabul or Mogadiscio in front of a determined effort by a regular army, but he is capable, and eagerly willing, to kill at random whenever he can, to make the work of administering a country as impossible for others as it is for himself. He is a mere agent of ruin; which is one reason why this conflict is unlike any war in history.

The insurgent level you are describing is "guerilla," and far from being "unlike any war in history," this sort of conflict is very common in history. Guerilla forces cannot effectively resist regular armies but they can resist paramilitary and police forces, enabling them to prevent the proper administration of an area. They can be knocked down to terrorist level operations by resolute and numerous patrols and garrisons; if left to fester they build to main force strength, creating a "liberated zone." This is all very standard insurgency / counter-insurgency theory, and practice.

In fact, it's older than main force warfare -- this sort of raiding / counter-raiding activity is what pitched battles evolved from.

Oddly enough, enormous numbers do. They are just not reported that way, thanks to the incompetence, cowardice and compromise of the Western media.

Ok, if you want to classify things like the rape epidemics as "terrorism" (which makes some sense) the solution is to come down hard, using the criminal system, on those who commit and also those who inspire those crimes. The rapists, etc. should be sentenced to maximum consecutive terms; the clerics should be prosecuted under ever "incitement" statute you can dig up; and any claims based on religion should be treated as aggravating rather than mitigating factors.

I do not, unfortunately, at present see much sign that the European Union countries are doing this. Instead they seem to be accepting "cultural" excuses as mitigating factors and trying to keep the crime wave secret to avoid Alarming the Populace.

And I know this is one aspect of the topic on which we are in agreement.

No, no, no, no, no, no. You simply refuse to see the obvious difference between then and now. Historically, the purpose of guerrilla warfare from King David (who was a guerrilla leader in his early days) to Josip Broz Tito was always to create large haven territories in which increasing masses of armed men could form real armies and sweep into the plains or the cities or whatever, eventually turning guerrilla warfare into war proper. This was guerrilla as practiced by Giuseppe Garibaldi or Pancho Villa. The purpose was always, one, to engage the enemy militarily, and two, to fight and win a war. The purpose of the modern mujahid is simply to cause chaos. The terrorist intends to blackmail society at large to prove that it cannot go on functioning unless it appeases him; an ambition that Emiliano Zapata or General Giap would have despised. He is not a soldier; he is a blackmailer. And modern terrorism, do not forget, is a Palestinian invention, began by Arafat after the catastrophe of 1967 proved once and for all that the most elaborate and massively armed Arab armies could not stand up to Israeli skill and discipline. The strategy shifted from fighting a war to making life impossible for the enemy. And the sad thing is that it seems to be paying.

People in Europe are still unhappy about singling out Muslims for special punishment, since it contrasts badly with the principle that The law is the same for all. Indeed, I doubt that using religious motivation as an aggravating circumstance would even be legal under the Italian constitution. And the principles of the law are things that we should not lightly leave behind, since if we are not fighting for them, what are we fighting for? But other than that, you underrate the effort of the State authorities in most European countries to both encourage and compel local Muslims to respect the law. The very fact that jails are swollen with Muslim prisoners hardly suggests that we do not take them seriously.

As for the terrible Muslim regular armies, can you point me at a single war since 1689 in which Western armies or navies have met Muslim forces without ripping them apart? Muslims are bad soldiers, because they are only willing to die. A good soldier is willing to fight and win; death is not something he wishes for, but something he is willing to risk in the pursuit of victory. And if there is one thing that history proves over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over again, it is that the educated soldier inevitably has the edge over the illiterate one, however obedient and brave. Illiteracy and ignorance are so widespread in the Muslim world that Muslim soldiers remain hopeless human material. It is largely because of the enormously higher educational level - allowing greater flexibility at all levels, a clearer understanding of specific goals, and more effective use of tools and weapons - that Israel has consistently overcome much larger Muslim armies. You can put a Muslim in a tank, but you cannot make him an engineer. And as for that dreadful Iranian army, what does it say about its real potential, that Iran is actually incapable to refine enough oil for its own use, and has to import petrol and other fuels from abroad? Not only is petrol, as the Nazis found out, of some importance in modern war, but a country that is so incapable of satisfying its basic needs cannot possibly have enough educated and trained men to take its army to a Western level. The same goes for the Muslim armies in Africa. The only successes they have achieved are in places like Sudan, when they were already in control of the state machinery and went after helpless iron-age villagers who started the war with old British Lee-Enfield rifles. And even so, Col.Garang's rebels, in spite of their isolation, poverty and lack of starting military resources, managed to give such a hard time to the government forces, that they were forced to reach a peace deal with the South (in spite of Garang's own mysterious death) which has not yet been breached. And believe me, if they felt strong enough to be able to breach it, they would. The truth is that the tribal southerners, starting with nothing but their courage, have thumped the Hell out of Khartoum Arabs with tanks and planes.

I believe that the ambitions of Al Qaeda and its allies reach farther than you imply. Yes, extortion of tribute, or of favorable diplomatic, political or social changes is one of their tactics and strategices, but it is not the only one; nor are terrorist teams their only type of forces.

The Terrorists do have national armies on their side; at present in the Mideast, the armies of Iran, Syria and the Sudan. Before our campaigns from 2001 to 2003, this included the armies of Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. The Terrorists field various guerilla as well as terrorist units; the reason why you have seen more use of terrorism than of guerilla or main force enemy operations in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars is not because of some doctrinal avoidance of guerilla or main force operations, but rather because our forces have been so active and competent in the field that the enemy has found any concentration of his own forces, even into guerilla bands, to be near-suicidal.

There have been periods of more traditional guerilla operations, by the way. In Afghanistan, where Allied forces are thin on the ground; in Pakistan, where a treacherous "ally" is providing a sanctuary (aided in this perfidy by the very main-force element of nuclear missiles); and at points in the Iraq campaign itself, when the Terorists tried to create a "liberated zone" in Fallujah (and did successfully coalesce into urban guerillas and small main force formations).

And modern terrorism, do not forget, is a Palestinian invention, began by Arafat after the catastrophe of 1967 proved once and for all that the most elaborate and massively armed Arab armies could not stand up to Israeli skill and discipline.

Note that the Palestinians climbed the insurgency ladder to guerilla and have now reached main force levels, as soon as they safely could. There are advantages to being higher on the ladder: main forces can do things that guerillas cannot; and guerillas things that terrorists cannot; what is more, higher-stage forces can always detach elements to carry out lower-stage missions, while the reverse is not true.

The strategy shifted from fighting a war to making life impossible for the enemy. And the sad thing is that it seems to be paying.

The point at which the payoff comes is when it induces withdrawal of our own forces -- letting the enemy build guerilla and main force units. Without main force units, in particular, the enemy cannot capture (or in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, recapture) any countries, to use as bases for further operations.

Yeah, right, and the Iraqi and Afghan armies have been so brilliant on the field. The truth is that the terrorist strategy is natural to the Muslim because (though they will never admit it) bitter experience has taught them that they cannot cope with regular troops. Pakistan is a peculiar case: the army is the central institution of the country, in a way that it is in no other Muslim country - not even Turkey or Egypt - and this for two interconnected reasons. First, Pakistan is part of the former Indian Empire, and shares with India the basic historical experience of watching immense Indian armies torn apart again and again by British armies one-tenth their size. This historical shock, whose force never abated down the centuries, has shaped the minds of both countries, in different ways; it was especially significant since most of the time the victorious British armies were only officered by native Britons, and most of their soldiery was Indian. The lesson was burned into local memories, and meant that when two new states coalesced out of the abandoned Empire, they both adopted wholesale Western instintutions. IN India, it was the whole structure of a Western country, with federal democratic institutions, and - much against Hindu traditions - equality before the law. In Pakistan, it was the Army, with army and staff colleges, barracks, iron discipline, and all the peculiar features of western military life. And, second point, this army found itself facing a similar but vastly stronger army on the Indian side, against which it lost a number of wars. Purely in order to survive, the Pakistani army had to preserve its basically Western traditions. The trainees of the staff colleges at Islamabad and Rawalpindi know too much to presume that mere popular anger of the kind that makes mujaheddeen could stand a chance against disciplined and prepared Indian troops. However, beneath the army is an immense, undereducated populace, whose natural leadership is not the Army but the mullahs. It is for their own survival as much as to make trouble for opponents, that the Army has allowed thousands of mujaheddeen down the years to cross over into Kashmir and Afghanistan: this relieves the pressure against the Army from below, which would otherwise lead to civil war and even possibly to the collapse of Pakistan. It is typical of the absolutely peculiar position of Pakistan in the Muslim world that it has been the only country capable of successfully producing an atom bomb (we are still to see whether Iran will be able to, even with massive Russian help).

People in Europe are still unhappy about singling out Muslims for special punishment, since it contrasts badly with the principle that The law is the same for all.

You wouldn't really have to "single them out" for special punishment though -- just stop singling them out for special tolerance. Treat aggressive madmen inciting violence and their dupes the same way that you would treat any such individuals, and don't let them plead the Koran as an excuse for their actions. Surely no one has special rights to kill, rape, assault or vandalize because of his faith, right?

The very fact that jails are swollen with Muslim prisoners hardly suggests that we do not take them seriously.

But for how long are you keeping them? Are you willing to go after the inciters and accessories, as well as the (duped) principals? And are you willing to expand your prisons if need be?

There is a lot at stake here. If the Muslims are allowed to build a shadow state alongside your own states, ruled by shari'a, then there will be no assimilation of the large Muslim immigrant populations, because those who try to assimilate will be forced off this path by the shadow state. And the creation of such a shadow state is an explicit aim of the radical Muslim clerics.

Futhermore, you are quite right that you should not abandon your own constitutional principles. But if the state, acting under these principles, fails to deal with the threat of a massive, violent unassimilated Muslim population attempting to force the rest of the population into dhimmitude, then the peoples of your countries will probably rise up, vote some sort of Fascist governments into office, and deal with the Muslims in a far less gentle fashion -- one likely to cause suffering to the innocent as well as the criminal.

And even that would be better than the Orson Scott Card future in which your lands become "Eurabia," your peoples living in servile fear, and your ancient cultures and traditions ruthlessly trampled by alien conquerors. Which is a very real possibility, if neither liberalism nor fascism finds a solution.

can you point me at a single war since 1689 in which Western armies or navies have met Muslim forces without ripping them apart?

Gallipolli?

War, not battle. Turkish troops distinguished themselves both in the Russian war of 1877 and in WWI, where they trashed the British not only at Gallipoli but at Kut-el-Amarah and in Palestine, but they ended up suffering total annihilating defeat. Besides, Gallipoli was a poorly chosen object. Only three years before, the Italian Navy had successfully stormed the Straits and bombed Gallipoli to put an end to the Italian-Turkish war (in which Italy conquered Lybya and Rhodes). Gallipoli and the Straits generally were an obvious target.

http://www.amazon.com/Our-Oldest-Enemy-Disastrous-Relationship/dp/0385512198/ref=pd_sim_b_3/102-4460705-3775365

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Prostitution of the pen and the dark side of the free market

Re: I'll leave you and <lj user = kulibali> to argue this out

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Re: They both murder.

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Quelling the Infection

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